Chinese influence operations: A comparative analysis of Taiwan and Japan

FROM:          Ashley Fox

SUBJECT:     Chinese influence operations: A comparative analysis of Taiwan and Japan   

DATE:            November 20, 2020

SUMMARY

            In recent years, cyber influence operations have gained traction as a critical security concern around the globe. While foreign influence operations are certainly not new, foreign nations' ability to exploit the openness of liberal democracies to influence policy and politics was brought to the mainstream conversation following the 2016 U.S. election.[i] As adversarial states like China bolster their capabilities for disseminating disinformation, sowing distrust, manipulating users of digital platforms, and weaponizing information, Japan and Taiwan have taken contrasting steps to counter influence operations within their digital borders.

CHINA AS A MAJOR INFLUENCE OPERATION ADVERSARY
             Under the direction of President Xi Jinping, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made significant changes to China’s national security strategy. In 2015, the CCP adopted a new national security strategy outline, citing "unpredictable" and "unprecedented" dangers facing the state nationally and internationally.[ii] The development of China's current national security situation began in the 1990s when the government noticed the U.S. military's use of information technology during the Gulf War and subsequent operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Understanding that information warfare plays a critical role in modern security, China began modernizing its military strategy toward "informationization” as outlined in its “2004 National Defense” white paper. [iii] This shift in focus to informationization has catalyzed China’s political influence operations against nations it deems a threat to its sovereignty or authority, including Taiwan and Japan.

While Russia has gained notoriety worldwide for election meddling, China has been operating beneath the radar for quite some time to the extent that should be perceived as a much more significant threat than what happened in the 2016 U.S. elections. The CCP has funneled upwards of $10 billion a year specifically into influence operations, or “external propaganda” abroad.[iv] As cyber influence operations are relatively inexpensive to run, this massive expenditure by the CCP is alarming and can reap significant benefits for China. In an essay for Foreign Affairs China expert, David Shambaugh wrote that "the Chinese communist system has always accepted that information must be managed and that people must be indoctrinated … Chinese authorities are trying to control information not only inside China but increasingly outside, too."  These efforts to control information outside of China are evidenced in its operations through various channels in both Taiwan and Japan. 

COUNTERING INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN TAIWAN

            While Taiwan's political status remains a major point of contention for China, the nation serves as a top target of Chinese influence operations. Chinese state-affiliated activities were rampant in the 2020 Taiwan presidential election, as the Chinese government continues to struggle to build a legitimate standing among Taiwanese citizens. Because China views Taiwan as a domestic information space, the tactics used for information operations on the island often vary from those used in other foreign nations.[v] These tactics include using content farms to create intentionally misleading or biased information, investing in Taiwanese media outlets that provide a pro-Beijing lean, and buying massive advertising space on social media platforms that cater to target demographics, specifically Taiwanese youth. According to a 2019 report by Varieties of Democracy, Taiwan receives the most foreign government disseminated disinformation globally.[vi]

            Taiwan’s position on information operations is primarily defensive in response to China's long history of aggression. Its entire annual defense budget is around $10 billion, compared to China's $154 billion. China spends $10 billion on influence operations alone. This is a concerning position to be in; however, Taiwan has had relative success in making do with what it has. Historically, Taiwan has relied heavily on the United States to deter China through the threat of intervention and provision of arms.[vii] However, physical intervention and arms provisions are not necessarily the best tools for cyber deterrence. To this end, Taiwan has taken a collaborative government and civil society approach through a combination of election interference legislation, banning known Chinese internet media platforms, widespread fact-checking, and digital literacy education for the Taiwanese public.[viii]

            Following widespread disinformation campaigns in January 2020, Taiwan banned Chinese digital platforms iQIYI and Tencent video. It established the Big Data and Public Opinion Task Force to coordinate with security institutions, including the Ministry of National Defense and the National Security Council. Furthermore, after election interference in the 2018 election, the Taiwanese legislature passed the "Public Media Act" in 2019 to address accountability, board governance, and financial independence for all public media organizations in the country. It also passed the "Anti-Infiltration Act" before the 2020 election to prevent "hostile foreign forces" from spreading disinformation, making political contributions, holding campaign events, or otherwise interfering in Taiwan's elections in any way. This law came with a fine of up to $334,000 and five years of imprisonment for any party found guilty of violating the law.[ix] It also made updates to its “Social Order Maintenance Act” to criminalize the intentional spread of misinformation.

 Moreover, the government focused heavily on Taiwanese citizens' education to strengthen their understanding of the threat of influence operations. One such example includes driving through rural areas of the country to educate residents on identifying fake news in the media. This effort to educate older citizens who are no longer in school through community outreach is part of a longer-term strategy for resilience by providing media literacy information as a formal part of the Taiwanese education system.

COUNTERING INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN JAPAN

            Contrastingly to Taiwan, Japan has not faced a significant issue with online fake news media apparatuses.[x] This is likely attributed to the fact that most Japanese citizens still rely primarily on traditional news sources and rarely utilize social media for this purpose. In a study of 36 countries, Japan ranked lowest in terms of the percentage of people who share news online. Moreover, some research shows no significant evidence of a concerted online effort through digital advertising, social media bots, or foreign governments to influence public opinion online.[xi] However, this shouldn’t be misconstrued to believe that Japan doesn’t face a threat from misinformation. While Japanese citizens may not be engaging with social media in a matter that exacerbates the widespread spread of mis- and disinformation through social media, there is still a significant threat presented by other means of influence operations within Japan, including news aggregators and online message boards, and more physical methods like universities.

            The nature of influence operations in Japan is mainly focused on the spread of hateful, xenophobic, highly-partisan, and blatantly false information within specific communities. This information does not have much of a foothold in influencing elections, nor does it have a wildfire-like spread like online disinformation campaigns seen in other countries. For context, false posts considered “widely shared” on Twitter received less than a tenth of 100 million eligible voters. Moreover, China has struggled to perpetuate any significant influence operation within Japan, despite a clear interest in shaping Japan's perceptions. Overall, Japan does not seem to consider online information operations to be an issue worth addressing on a large scale, and certainly not to Taiwan's extent. However, Japan has taken an interesting approach to ward off China's propaganda efforts by fighting fire with fire. For example, in 2017, Japan allegedly paid a London Think Tank around £10,000 per month to encourage British politicians to speak out against Chinese foreign policy efforts.[xii]

 Unlike Taiwan, Japan has not passed legislation regarding influence operations or the spread of misinformation online. It did pass a hate speech law in 2016 that currently holds no real criminal penalty or ban. However, after implementing the law, the participation level in xenophobic rallies dropped by nearly half.[xiii] In terms of the governance of information surrounding elections, some watchers argue that Japan has long neglected this space, making little-to-no changes to its Public Offices Election law since 1950.[xiv] Until recently, this law was widely interpreted to prohibit the use of internet platforms and social media by political candidates during the campaign period. Japan has also made no notable effort to educate its citizens on digital literacy or spotting false information.

DIFFERENCES AND CONVERGENCES

            Taiwan and Japan’s approached to combating influence operations both differ and converge in a few notable ways. First, they are similar in that China serves as a primary antagonist in their efforts to strengthen general defense and deterrence structures. Taiwan’s efforts to deter influence operations have centered significantly on combating election influence and initiatives to spread a pro-unity message across the island, namely on online platforms. On the other hand, Japan has had to deal more with issues of fear mongering, hate speech, hoaxes, and hyper-partisan and racist content through message boards and news aggregators within specific communities. In sum, Taiwan has taken a much more nuanced and strategic approach to overtly combating influence operations. In contrast, Japan does not acknowledge that it is an issue worth addressing for now. 

[i] Carolyn Kenney, Max Bergmann, and James Lamond, “Understanding and Combating Russian and Chinese Influence Operations,” Center for American Progress, accessed November 20, 2020, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/02/28/466669/understanding-combating-russian-chinese-influence-operations/.

[ii]Tiezzi, Shannon, “China’s National Security,” The Diplomat, January 24, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-national-security-strategy/.

[iii] The Communist Party of China, “China’s National Defense in 2004,” 2004, http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html.

[iv] David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push,” June 1, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/chinas-soft-power-push.

[v] “Chinese Influence Operations Evolve in Campaigns Targeting Taiwanese Elections, Hong Kong Protests,” Recorded Future (blog), April 29, 2020, https://www.recfut.com/chinese-influence-operations/.

[vi] “Democracy Facing Global Challenges: V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019” (V-Dem Institute, May 2019), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf.

[vii] “Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan’s Radical New Defense Concept,” War on the Rocks, October 2, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new-defense-concept/.

[viii] “How to Counter China’s Disinformation Campaign in Taiwan,” Army University Press, accessed November 20, 2020, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2020/Zhang-Disinformation-Campaign/.

[ix] Eli Huang, “Taiwan’s Achilles’ Heel in a Conflict with China Is Not What You Think,” Text, The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, December 3, 2017), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/taiwans-achilles%E2%80%99-heel-conflict-china-not-what-you-think-23481.

[x] Kanchan Kaur & Shyam Subhash Nair (India) et al., “Information Disorder in Asia and the Pacific,” March 3, 2019, https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=386104017119024103080077081021088007006004057060022070075030118112069093092004105119107060037031026002028122066092071086088101118014013047021119127064124001091101119050069001082089108116118069120084098121118120031101001127029097099115069116013000113006&EXT=pdf.

[xi] Kanchan Kaur & Shyam Subhash Nair (India) et al.

[xii] “British Think-Tank ‘paid by Japan’ to Spread Anti-China Propaganda - World - Chinadaily.Com.Cn,” accessed November 20, 2020, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-02/03/content_28095515.htm.

[xiii] No Author, “A Year after Enactment of Hate Speech Law, Xenophobic Rallies down by Nearly Half,” The Japan Times, May 22, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/05/22/national/social-issues/year-enactment-hate-speech-law-xenophobic-rallies-nearly-half/.

[xiv] Laura Anne Freeman, “Information Governance and Election Campaigning in Japan: The Public Offices Election Law in Historical and Comparative Perspective” (Stanford Silicon Valley New Japan Project, 2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54b4afe7e4b096f7dca62bef/t/59cc208ad55b41f2f9183295/1506549909344/Information+Governance+in+Japan+%28Full%29.pdf.